Sound Verification and Synthesis with Logic and Data

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[references at end of deck]

Outline

1. Why this Matters: Science and Technology Drivers
2. Sound Inductive Synthesis with Neural Certificates
3. Formal Verification with Neural Abstractions
4. Safe and Certified Learning

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Control theory vs Formal verification

- dynamical models

$$x \in \mathbb{R}^n$$
$$\mathcal{G}_i \subset \mathbb{R}^n, i \in \{1, \dots m\}$$
$$\forall x \in \mathcal{G}_i, \quad x^+ = f_i(x)$$

- stability,
  safety,
  reachability
- Lyapunov functions,
  barrier certificates,
  reach-set computation





- software programs

```
x float
...
while Gi(x)
    x+ := fi(x)
endwhile
...
```

- termination,
  assertion violation
- ranking functions,
  program/loop invariants,
  symbolic search



```
def add5(x):
   return x+5

def dotwrite(ast):
   nodename = getNodename()
   label=symbol.sym_name.get(int(ast[0]),ast[0])
   print '    %s [label="%s' % (nodename, label),
   if isinstance(ast[1], str):
      if ast[1].strip():
         print '= %s"];' % ast[1]
      else:
         print '"]'
   else:
      print '"];'
      children = []
      for n, child in enumerate(ast[1:]):
         children.append(dotwrite(child))
      print '    %s -> {' % nodename,
      for name in children:
         print '%s' % name,
```

Cyber-Physical Systems

- complex embedded systems
- interleaving of cyber/digital components with physical/analogue dynamics

- hybrid models
- dynamics, control and computation

  (and communication)

- safety-critical applications

→ correct-by-design control

→ sound and automated synthesis

Formal verification in a nutshell

- industrial impact in checking the correct behaviour of

protocols, hardware circuits, and software



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

- model-based algorithms (and SW tools)
- automated, sound, and formal proofs (e.g., via certificates)

Formal verification in a nutshell

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Properties: Encoding rich dynamical behaviour

- as specifications, requirements for verification, e.g., safety
- as objectives for control synthesis, e.g., reachability
- without manual reward engineering

Properties: Encoding rich dynamical behaviour

$$x \in \mathbb{R}^n$$
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$$\forall x \in \mathcal{G}_i, \quad x^+ = f_i(x)$$





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

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

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

$x^+ = f(x)$

$$x: \quad x_0 \rightarrow \quad x_1 \rightarrow \quad x_2 \rightarrow \quad \ldots$$
$$\rho: \quad \mathcal{G}_{x_0} \rightarrow \quad \mathcal{G}_{x_1} \rightarrow \quad \mathcal{G}_{x_2} \rightarrow \quad \ldots$$

Properties: Encoding rich dynamical behaviour

- consider (class of) properties/requirements/specifications

$$\forall x_0 \in \mathcal{I}, \quad \exists T \in \mathbb{N}^+, \quad \forall k \in \{0,1,\ldots,T-1\}, \quad \forall \tau \geq T :$$
$$x_T \in \mathcal{G}, \quad x_k \notin \mathcal{U}, \quad x_\tau \in \mathcal{F}$$



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

a: Stability b: ROA c: Safety d: SWA e: Reachability f: RWA g: RSWA h: RAR

- class encompasses stability, invariance, safety, reachability, reach-avoid, ...

Properties: Encoding rich dynamical behaviour

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

a: Stability b: ROA c: Safety d: SWA e: Reachability f: RWA g: RSWA h: RAR

- connections to:
  1. automata theory
  2. temporal logics
  3. formal languages

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Decision problems: SAT and SMT

- SAT is a decision problem (yes/no question)
- find satisfying assignment of Boolean functions
- e.g., assume Boolean x_i, check

$$\exists x_1, x_2, x_3 : \quad (x_1 \vee \neg x_2) \wedge (\neg x_1 \vee x_2 \vee x_3) \wedge \neg x_1$$

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- SMT is a decision problem for logical formulae within a theory
- instance: theory of non-linear arithmetics over real closed fields
- e.g., assume reals $x_i \in \mathbb{R}$, check

$$\exists x_1, x_2 : \quad x_1 \geq 0 \Rightarrow 3x_1 + 2x_2 + 1 > 0$$

From decision to synthesis problems

- consider (harder) problem:
  assume integers $x_i \in \mathbb{Z}$,
  seek function $F : \mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z} \to \mathbb{Z}$, s.t.

$$\exists F, \forall x_1, x_2 :$$
$$F(x_1, x_2) \geq x_1 \wedge F(x_1, x_2) \geq x_2 \wedge (F(x_1, x_2) = x_1 \vee F(x_1, x_2) = x_2)$$

Lyapunov functions

- consider $\dot{x} = f(x)$, assume $x_e \in \mathbb{R}^n$ is an equilibrium, $f(x_e) = 0$
- ensure asymptotic stability of x_e in $\mathcal{D} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$
- by finding Lyapunov function $V(x)$, satisfying

1. lower bound:
$$V(x_e) = 0 \tag{1}$$
2. positive definiteness:
$$V(x) > 0,\ \forall x \in \mathcal{D} \setminus \{x_e\} \tag{2}$$
3. negative Lie derivative:
$$\dot{V}(x) = \nabla V(x) \cdot f(x) < 0,\ \forall x \in \mathcal{D} \setminus \{x_e\} \tag{3}$$

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- that is, solve following synthesis problem:

$$\exists V : \mathcal{D} \to \mathbb{R} \quad s.t.\ \ \forall x \in \mathcal{D}, \quad \text{conditions (1)} \wedge \text{(2)} \wedge \text{(3) hold}$$

Counterexample-guided inductive synthesis (CEGIS)



1. Learner

   generates candidates V over finite set

2. Verifier

   certifies validity on $\mathcal{D}$, or provides counterexample(s) c

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

1. Learner

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- inductive synthesis loop

  1. sample (finite) set $S \subset \mathcal{D}$
  2. Learner generates $V(\theta)$ via query SMT solver on formula: $\exists \theta$: (1) $\wedge$ (2) $\wedge$ (3) on points $s \in S$
  3. Verifier checks either $V(x)$ valid over dense $\mathcal{D}$, or counterexample c : query SMT solver on formula $\exists c \in \mathcal{D} : \neg(1) \vee \neg(2) \vee \neg(3)$
  4. $S \leftarrow S \cup c$, loop back to 2

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

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- sound, but not complete: infinite search space (θ in V) and domain $\mathcal{D}$

Lyapunov functions as neural networks

- neural nets are general and flexible (universal function approximators)
- Learner trains shallow neural network

$$V(x) = W_2 \cdot \sigma_1(W_1 x + b_1)$$

(W_i weights, (σ_1) activation fcns)



- loss function enforces Lyapunov conditions in (2) and (3) on points in S:

$$L(S) = \sum_{s \in S} \max\{0, -V(s)\} + \sum_{s \in S} \max\{0, \dot{V}(s)\}$$

- loss function L is *"pretty good"* proxy of synthesis formula

Lyapunov functions as neural networks



- surprisingly effective! Communication *Learner* $\leftrightarrow$ *Verifier* is crucial

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Synthesis of Lyapunov functions - example



Barrier certificates

- consider sets $\mathcal{I}$ (initial) and $\mathcal{U}$ (unsafe)
- ensure there exists no trajectory starting in $\mathcal{I}$ ever entering $\mathcal{U}$

1. negativity within initial set $\mathcal{I}$:

$$B(x) \leq 0 \; \forall x \in \mathcal{I}$$

2. positivity within unsafe set $\mathcal{U}$:

$$B(x) > 0 \; \forall x \in \mathcal{U}$$

3. set invariance property via Lie derivative:

$$\dot{B}(x) < 0 \; \forall x \text{ s.t. } B(x) = 0$$

Barrier certificates





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Synthesis of barrier certificates - examples





$$\begin{cases} \dot{x} &= y + 2xy, \\ \dot{y} &= -x + 2x^2 - y^2 \end{cases}$$

[10] · Linear

Synthesis of barrier certificates - examples





$$\begin{cases} \dot{x} &= \exp(-x) + y - 1, \\ \dot{y} &= -\sin(x)^2 \end{cases}$$

[20] · Softplus

Synthesis of barrier certificates - examples





$$\begin{cases} \dot{x} &= y, \\ \dot{y} &= -x - y + \frac{1}{3}x^3 \end{cases}$$

$[20, 20] \cdot$ Sigmoid, Sigmoid

Synthesis of barrier certificates - benchmarks

Benchmark	CEGIS (this work)				BC[1]			SOS[2]	
	Learn	Verify	Samples	Iters	Learn	Verify	Samples	Synth	Verify
Darboux	31.6	0.01	0.5 k	2	54.9	20.8	65 k	$\times$	–
Exponential	15.9	0.07	1.5 k	2	234.0	11.3	65 k	$\times$	–
Obstacle	55.5	1.83	2.0 k	9	3165.3	1003.3	2097 k	$\times$	–
Polynomial	64.5	4.20	2.3 k	2	1731.0	635.3	65 k	8.10	$\times$
Hybrid mod	0.58	2.01	0.5 k	1	–	–	–	12.30	0.11
4-d ODE	29.31	0.07	1 k	1	–	–	–	12.90	OOT
6-d ODE	89.52	1.61	1 k	3	–	–	–	16.60	OOT
8-d ODE	104.5	82.51	1 k	3	–	–	–	26.10	OOT

- time for Learning and Verification steps in [sec]
- 'Samples' = size of input data for Learner (in thousands)
- 'Iters' = number of iterations of CEGIS loop
- $\times$ = synthesis or verification failure, OOT = verification timeout

[1] H. Zhao, X. Zeng, T. Chen, and Z. Liu. Synthesizing Barrier Certificates Using Neural Networks. In Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Hybrid Systems: Computation and Control, HSCC, 2020.

[2] A. Papachristodoulou, J. Anderson, G. Valmorbida, S. Prajna, P. Seiler, and P. A. Parrilo. SOSTOOLS: Sum of squares optimization toolbox for MATLAB, 2013.

Synthesis of control certificates for complex tasks

- dynamical models with inputs (a.k.a., external non-determinism)

$$\dot{x} = f(x, u)$$

$\rightarrow$ synthesis of "control certificates"

- modify known synthesis problem:

$$\exists V : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \quad s.t. \ \ \forall x \in \mathcal{D} \quad \text{conditions } (1) \wedge (2) \wedge (3) \text{ hold}$$

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- dynamical models with inputs (a.k.a., external non-determinism)

$$\dot{x} = f(x, u)$$

$\rightarrow$ synthesis of "control certificates"

- approach:
  1. control policies are NN-templated
  2. concurrent synthesis controls & certificates

Synthesis of control certificates for complex tasks

- dynamical models with inputs (a.k.a., external non-determinism)

$$\dot{x} = f(x, u)$$

→ synthesis of "control certificates"

- (back to) broad class of properties/requirements

$$\forall x_0 \in \mathcal{I}, \quad \exists T \in \mathbb{N}^+, \quad \forall t \in \{0, \ldots, T-1\}, \quad \forall \tau \geq T :$$
$$x_T \in \mathcal{G}, \quad x_t \notin \mathcal{U}, \quad x_\tau \in \mathcal{F}$$



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$\rightarrow$ synthesis of "control certificates"

	N_s	N_u	Property	Neurons	Activations	T (s)			Success (%)
						min	μ	max	S
1	2	0	Stability	[6]	$[\varphi_2]$	0.01 ($\approx$ 0.00)	0.16 (0.15)	1.50 (1.48)	100
2	3	0	Stability	[8]	$[\varphi_2]$	0.28 ($\approx$ 0.00)	2.22 (0.45)	12.57 (3.31)	100
3	2	2	Stability	[4]	$[\varphi_2]$	0.07 (0.01)	0.19 (0.02)	0.47 (0.04)	100
4	2	2	Stability	[5]	$[\varphi_2]$	0.09 (0.01)	0.26 (0.02)	0.54 (0.03)	100
5	2	0	ROA	[5]	$[\sigma_{\mathrm{soft}}]$	0.21 (0.12)	14.09 (12.59)	25.32 (22.13)	40
6	3	3	ROA	[8]	$[\varphi_2]$	1.24 (0.02)	39.08 (0.03)	287.89 (0.04)	100
7	2	0	Safety	[15]	$[\sigma_{\mathrm{t}}]$	0.44 (0.35)	3.36 (2.90)	7.61 (7.11)	100
9	8	0	Safety	[10]	$[\varphi_1]$	12.63 (7.71)	51.97 (32.75)	70.59 (44.66)	70
10	3	1	Safety	[15]	$[\sigma_{\mathrm{t}}]$	1.57 (0.19)	11.87 (2.50)	51.08 (7.52)	90
11	3	0	SWA	[6], [5]	$[\varphi_2]$, $[\sigma_{\mathrm{t}}]$	0.19 (0.05)	2.46 (0.100)	12.10 (0.20)	90
12	2	0	SWA	[5], [5, 5]	$[\varphi_2]$, $[\sigma_{\mathrm{sig}},\varphi_2]$	0.13 (0.06)	0.27 (0.14)	0.39 (0.20)	100
13	2	1	SWA	[8], [5]	$[\varphi_2]$, $[\varphi_2]$	0.06 (0.03)	0.20 (0.10)	0.58 (0.24)	90
14	3	1	SWA	[10], [8]	$[\varphi_2]$, $[\sigma_{\mathrm{t}}]$	4.06 (0.87)	19.81 (2.73)	103.49 (7.23)	90
15	2	0	RWA	[4]	$[\varphi_2]$	0.14 (0.09)	1.81 (1.75)	4.70 (4.63)	100
16	3	0	RWA	[16]	$[\varphi_2]$	1.36 (0.09)	14.10 (0.14)	72.97 (0.20)	90
17	2	1	RWA	[4, 4]	$[\sigma_{\mathrm{sig}},\varphi_2]$	0.59 (0.27)	6.82 (3.32)	20.07 (11.46)	100
18	3	1	RWA	[5]	$[\varphi_2]$	0.46 (0.11)	16.06 (5.81)	72.47 (44.64)	80
19	2	2	RWA	[5]	$[\sigma_{\mathrm{sig}}]$	0.69 (0.40)	1.38 (0.94)	2.14 (1.90)	100
20	2	0	RSWA	[4]	$[\varphi_2]$	0.19 (0.03)	1.29 (1.04)	3.79 (3.37)	100
21	3	0	RSWA	[16]	$[\varphi_2]$	4.81 (0.13)	27.14 (0.19)	80.95 (0.25)	100
22	2	0	RSWA	[5, 5]	$[\sigma_{\mathrm{sig}},\varphi_2]$	1.52 (0.06)	4.45 (0.19)	10.97 (0.35)	100
23	2	1	RSWA	[8]	$[\varphi_2]$	0.21 (0.05)	0.67 (0.25)	1.19 (0.91)	100
24	2	2	RSWA	[5, 5]	$[\sigma_{\mathrm{sig}},\varphi_2]$	0.98 (0.16)	1.23 (0.28)	1.61 (0.46)	100
25	2	0	RAR	[6], [6]	$[\sigma_{\mathrm{soft}}]$, $[\varphi_2]$	6.65 (1.08)	24.74 (6.46)	77.80 (15.06)	100
26	2	2	RAR	[6, 6], [6, 6]	$[\sigma_{\mathrm{sig}},\varphi_2]$, $[\sigma_{\mathrm{sig}},\varphi_2]$	5.13 (1.34)	26.99 (9.90)	101.23 (60.14)	100

Synthesis of control certificates for complex tasks

- dynamical models with inputs (a.k.a., external non-determinism)

$$\dot{x} = f(x, u)$$

$\rightarrow$ synthesis of "control certificates"



ROA for NL model, non-poly Lyapunov, 2 disjoint initial sets



RWA: reach-while-avoid



RAR certificate for closed-loop NL model

dashed lines: level sets; dark blue: $\mathcal{I}$; light blue: $\mathcal{S}$; green: $\mathcal{G}$; orange: $\mathcal{F}$

Software for Neural Synthesis - Fossil 2.0



`github.com/oxford-oxcav/fossil`

Extension: discrete-time, prob. programs/models

- discrete-time models (e.g. SW programs)

$$\texttt{while g(x),}\ x^+\ \texttt{:= f(x)}$$

→ similar Lyapunov-like conditions, except concerning "next step":

$$V(f(x)) < V(x), \quad \forall x \in \mathcal{D} \setminus \{x_e\}$$

- stochastic models:

$$x^+ = f(x) + \sigma(x), \quad \sigma \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \Sigma(x))$$

→ same story, "next step"-condition in expectation (super-martingale):

$$\mathbb{E}[V(f(x)) \mid x] < V(x), \quad \forall x \in \mathcal{D} \setminus \{x_e\}$$

Outline

1. Why this Matters: Science and Technology Drivers
2. Sound Inductive Synthesis with Neural Certificates
3. Formal Verification with Neural Abstractions
4. Safe and Certified Learning

Outline

Formal abstractions

complex model

specification

Formal abstractions

ξ-quantitative abstraction

complex model

specification

Formal abstractions



Formal abstractions



Formal abstractions

abstract model — ξ-specification

automated verification

ξ-quantitative abstraction

complex model — specification

Formal abstractions

SAT,
model
checking

automated
verification

abstract
model

ζ-specification

ζ-quantitative
abstraction

complex
model

specification

Formal abstractions

SAT, model checking

abstract model ξ-specification

automated verification

ξ-spec holds, policy $\mu_\xi \models \xi$-spec

ξ-quantitative abstraction

complex model specification

Formal abstractions

SAT, model checking

abstract model | ξ-specification

automated verification

ξ-spec holds, policy $\mu_\xi \models \xi$-spec

ξ-quantitative abstraction

refine back

complex model | specification

Formal abstractions



Formal abstractions



From uncountable to finite stochastic models

∞-space Markov process

$s \in \mathbb{R}^n$

$$s^+ = f(s) + \sigma(s), \quad \sigma \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \Sigma(s))$$



finite-space Markov chain

$\{z_1, z_2, z_3, \ldots, z_p\}$

$$\mathbb{T} = \begin{bmatrix} p_{11} & \cdots & p_{1p} \\ \cdots & \cdots & \cdots \\ p_{p1} & \cdots & \cdots \end{bmatrix}$$



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



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





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





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





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





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

- error $\xi \sim h_s \delta T$, where

  δ - max diameter of partitions

  T - time horizon

  h_s - local kernel stiffness (Lipschitz constant)

From uncountable to finite stochastic models



- error $\xi \sim h_s \delta T$, where

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- probabilistic safety:

  prob. p_s *that execution, started at* $s \in \mathcal{I}$, *stays in set* $A = \mathcal{U}^c$ *within* $[0, T]$,

From uncountable to finite stochastic models



- error $\xi \sim h_s \delta T$, where
  δ - max diameter of partitions
  T - time horizon
  h_s - local kernel stiffness (Lipschitz constant)

- probabilistic safety:
  prob. p_s that execution, started at $s \in \mathcal{I}$, stays in set $A = \mathcal{U}^c$ within $[0, T]$,
  can be computed on abstract model as $\tilde{p}_z$, so that $p_s = \tilde{p}_z \pm \xi$

Software for formal abstractions - FAUST^2 & StocHy

- sequential, adaptive, anytime





a: Stability b: ROA c: Safety d: SWA e: Reachability f: RWA g: RSWA h: RAR

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



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



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



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



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





`sourceforge.net/projects/faust2`

`gitlab.com/natchi92/StocHy`

- numerous extensions and applications
- wide ecosystem of SHS abstractions
- annual ARCH competition `cps-vo.org/group/ARCH`





EPiC Series in Computing
Volume 80, 2021, Pages 55–89
8th International Workshop on Applied Verification of Continuous and Hybrid Systems (ARCH21)

ARCH-COMP21 Category Report: Stochastic Models

Alessandro Abate[1], Henk Blom[2], Marc Bouissou[3], Nathalie Cauchi[1], Hassane Chraibi[3], Joanna Delicaris[4], Sofie Haesaert[5], Arnd Hartmanns[6], Mahmoud Khaled[7], Abolfazl Lavaei[8], Hao Ma[2], Kaushik Mallik[9], Mathis Niehage[4], Anne Remke[4], Stefan Schupp[10], Fedor Shmarov[11], Sadegh Soudjani[12], Adam Thorpe[13], Vlad Turcuman[1], and Paolo Zuliani[12]

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[4] University of Münster, Germany
[5] TU Eindhoven, Eindhoven, The Netherlands
[6] University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands
[7] Technical University of Munich, Germany
[8] ETH Zurich, Switzerland
[9] Max Planck Institute for Software Systems, Germany
[10] TU Wien, Vienna, Austria
[11] University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
[12] Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
[13] University of New Mexico, USA

Abstract

This report presents the results of a friendly competition for formal verification and policy synthesis of stochastic models. It also introduces new benchmarks within this category, and recommends next steps for this category towards next year's edition of the competition. The friendly competition took place as part of the workshop Applied Verification for Continuous and Hybrid Systems (ARCH) in Spring/Summer 2021.

Model hybridisations

- safety verification of non-linear models $\dot{x} = f(x)$ over $x \in \mathcal{X} \subset \mathbb{R}^n$,
- it is in general hard - not automated, not scalable



$$\begin{cases} \dot{x} &= -y - 1.5x^2 - 0.5x^3 - 0.5 \\ \dot{y} &= 3x - y \end{cases}$$



$$\begin{cases} \dot{x} &= x^2 + y \\ \dot{y} &= \sqrt[3]{x^2} - x \end{cases}$$

$$\mathcal{X} = [-1, 1]^2$$

Model hybridisations

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- leverage formal abstractions (simulations) for verification

- abstraction as hybridisation:
  partition $\mathcal{X}$, locally approximate $f(x)$ as $\tilde{f}(x)$
  each partition has own flow $\tilde{f}(x)$ & transitions to other partitions

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- abstraction as hybridisation:
  partition $\mathcal{X}$, locally approximate $f(x)$ as $\tilde{f}(x)$
  each partition has own flow $\tilde{f}(x)$ & transitions to other partitions
- compute upper-bound ξ to error; obtain simulation as

$$\dot{x} = \tilde{f}(x) + d, \quad \|d\| \leq \xi, \quad x \in \mathcal{X}$$

Model hybridisations

- safety verification of non-linear models $\dot{x} = f(x)$ over $x \in \mathcal{X} \subset \mathbb{R}^n$,
- it is in general hard - not automated, not scalable

- leverage formal abstractions (simulations) for verification

- abstraction as hybridisation:
  partition $\mathcal{X}$, locally approximate $f(x)$ as $\tilde{f}(x)$
  each partition has own flow $\tilde{f}(x)$ & transitions to other partitions
- compute upper-bound ξ to error; obtain simulation as

$$\dot{x} = \tilde{f}(x) + d, \quad \|d\| \leq \xi, \quad x \in \mathcal{X}$$

- more partitions $\rightarrow$ larger abstraction

! mesh size & shape important for small error bound ξ

Model hybridisations as neural abstractions





- neural network $\mathcal{N}$ as abstraction $\tilde{f}$ of nonlinear vector field f
- $\mathcal{N}(x) : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}^n$ approximates $f(x)$
- H neurons $\to$ at most 2^H total partitions

Model hybridisations as neural abstractions





- synthesis of neural abstractions via CEGIS
  1. learn parameters of NN $\mathcal{N}$ w/ MSE loss $\mathcal{L} = \|f(S) - \mathcal{N}(S)\|$, S finite
  2. SMT solver formally checks upper bound ξ on approximation error:

$$\exists c \in \mathcal{X} \quad s.t. \ \|f(c) - \mathcal{N}(c)\| > \xi$$

Model hybridisations as neural abstractions - examples

$$\begin{cases} \dot{x} &= y - 1.5x^2 - 0.5x^3 \\ \dot{y} &= 3x - y \end{cases}$$




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


$$\begin{cases} \dot{x} &= x^2 + y \\ \dot{y} &= \sqrt[3]{x^2} - x \end{cases}$$




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



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



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



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



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



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



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

Safety verification via neural abstractions



Neural abstractions: alternative templates

	Piecewise constant	**Piecewise affine**	**Nonlinear**
Concrete model	Nonlinear, non-Lipschitz	Nonlinear, non-Lipschitz	Nonlinear, non-Lipschitz
Activation functions			
Training procedure	Particle swarm	Gradient descent	Gradient descent
Loss function	$\max_{s \in S} l^{\infty}(s)$	$\frac{1}{\lvert S \rvert} \sum_{s \in S} l^2(s)$	$\frac{1}{\lvert S \rvert} \sum_{s \in S} l^2(s)$
Abstract model	PWA with disturbance	PWC with disturbance	NL-ODE with disturbance
Safety verification tech	Symbolic model checking	Reach algorithm	Flowpipe propagation (Taylor models)
Safety verification tool	PHAVer	SpaceEx	Flow*

Neural abstractions: alternative templates



(a) Neural PWC abstraction



(b) Neural PWA abstraction



(c) Sigmoidal abstraction.



(a) Flowpipes for neural PWC model. 11.6s



(b) Flowpipe for neural PWA model. 76.5s



(c) Flowpipe for sigmoidal model. 1084.3s

Outline

1. Why this Matters: Science and Technology Drivers
2. Sound Inductive Synthesis with Neural Certificates
3. Formal Verification with Neural Abstractions
4. Safe and Certified Learning

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Reinforcement learning

- learning algorithm, relies on reward signal from environment
- synthesises policies (actions) maximising cumulative reward



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

- rewards are not enough!
- verification goal: certified synthesis of policies satisfying requirement, task

Certified reinforcement learning: LCRL

IN requirement, task

- encode task, e.g. temporal requirement in LTL formula, as automaton
- synchronise automaton with environment `% via labels`
- synthesise policies via RL `% automaton guides/rewards exploration`

OUT certified policies: max probability of task satisfaction



Certified reinforcement learning: LCRL









- model-free $\rightarrow$ extracts information efficiently
- guided learning $\rightarrow$ faster convergence, high-dimensional environments
- flexible $\rightarrow$ numerous extensions and applications

Ambiguity and Misspecification in Inverse RL



- inverse RL: from expert behaviour to rewards
- preference elicitation and alignment
- formalising reward learning with
  1. invariances

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Ambiguity and Misspecification in Inverse RL



- inverse RL: from expert behaviour to rewards
- preference elicitation and alignment
- formalising reward learning with
  1. invariances
  2. metrics





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Thank you for your attention

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Backup slides

Formal abstractions: algorithm

- approximate stochastic process $(\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{T})$ as Markov chain $(S, \mathbb{T})$, where
  - $S = \{z_1, z_2, \ldots, z_p\}$ – finite set of abstract states
  - $\mathbb{T} : \mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{S} \to [0,1]$ – transition probability matrix

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

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input: stochastic process $(\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{T})$

1. select finite partition $\mathcal{S} = \cup_{i=1}^{p} S_i$ [aligned with $\mathcal{G}_i$]
2. select representative points $z_i \in S_i$
3. define finite state space $S := \{z_i, i = 1, ..., p\}$

output: Markov chain $(S, \mathbb{T})$



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

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

Formal abstractions: error ξ

- consider $\mathcal{T}(d\bar{s}|s) = \mathfrak{t}(\bar{s}|s)d\bar{s}$; assume $\mathfrak{t}$ is Lipschitz continuous, namely

$$\exists\, 0 \leq h_s < \infty : \quad \left|\mathfrak{t}(\bar{s}|s) - \mathfrak{t}(\bar{s}|s')\right| \leq h_s \left\|s - s'\right\|, \quad \forall s, s', \bar{s} \in \mathcal{S}$$

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- one-step error

  $\epsilon = h_s \delta$, $\quad \delta$ max diameter of partition sets

- T-step error *(tuneable via δ)*

  $\xi(\delta, T) = \epsilon T$

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

$\rightarrow$ improved and generalised error ξ

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

$\rightarrow$ improved and generalised error ξ

Formal abstractions: probabilistic safety



- recall temporal logic properties, e.g. probabilistic safety:

probability that execution, started at $s \in \mathcal{I}$,
stays in safe set $A = \mathcal{U}^c$ within $[0, T]$

$$\mathcal{P}_s(A) = \mathbb{P}_s(s_k \in A, \forall k \in [0, T])$$

- probabilistic safe set with safety level $\theta \in [0, 1]$ is

$$S(\theta) = \{s \in \mathcal{S} : \mathcal{P}_s(A) \geq \theta\}$$

Formal abstractions: probabilistic safety



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$$S(\theta) = \{s \in \mathcal{S} : \mathcal{P}_s(A) \geq \theta\}$$

- whenever stochastic process $(\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{T})$ is controlled, $\sup_\pi \mathcal{P}_s(A)$

Formal abstractions: probabilistic safety



- δ-abstract $(\mathcal{S},\mathcal{T})$ as MC $(S,\mathbb{T})$, so that $A \to A_\delta$, quantify error $\xi(\delta, T)$ as above

$\Rightarrow$ probabilistic safe set on $(\mathcal{S},\mathcal{T})$

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

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is automatically computed with model checker (e.g. PRISM) on $(S, \mathbb{T})$ as

$$\begin{aligned} Z_\delta(\theta+\xi) &\doteq \mathsf{Sat}\left(\mathbb{P}_{\geq\theta+\xi}\left(\Box^{\leq T} A_\delta\right)\right) \\ &= \left\{z \in S : z \models \mathbb{P}_{\geq\theta+\xi}\left(\Box^{\leq T} A_\delta\right)\right\} \end{aligned}$$

- whenever stochastic process $(\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{T})$ is controlled, obtain $\arg\sup_\pi \mathcal{P}_s(A)$

Formal abstractions with data

- alluring idea: can we abstract models by sampling their dynamics?



Formal abstractions with data

“Timeō dāta, et dōna ferentēs” [Laocoon, Aeneid]

- alluring idea: can we abstract models by sampling their dynamics?
- Beware many subtle issues: zero-measure sets, memory dependencies, ...







$y_0 y_1 \ldots y_{19} = 01110111011101110111$

$$x^{+} = x + \theta \bmod 2\pi$$

Formal abstractions with data

$$x^+ = A(\alpha)x + B(\alpha)u + \sigma$$

- $\sigma \sim \mathcal{P}$ unknown - aleatoric uncertainty
- $\alpha \in \Theta$ - epistemic uncertainty

(ρ is trace of closed-loop trajectory)



(probabilistic reach-avoid specification)

Given $T \in \mathbb{N}$, and sets $\mathcal{G}$ (goal) and $\mathcal{U}^C$ (safe), find controller s.t., $\forall x_0 \in \mathcal{I}$,

$$\mathbb{P}_{\mathcal{I}}\{\rho \models \mathcal{U}^C \mathsf{U}^{\leq T} \mathcal{G}\} \geq \theta, \quad \text{with confidence} \geq 1 - \beta$$

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



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



- scenario approach for convex optimisation: $\mathbb{P}\{\underline{p} \leq P(s' \mid s_i, a) \leq \bar{p}\} \geq 1 - \beta$
- abstraction as iMDP

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



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



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



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







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