## Knowledge Representation and Learning 10. First Order Logic - Herbrand Theorem

Luciano Serafini

Fondazione Bruno Kessler

May 12, 2023

Luciano Serafini (Fondazione Bruno Kessler) Knowledge Representation and Learning

May 12, 2023 1 / 23

### Definition (quantifier-free formula)

A formula  $\phi$  is quantifier-free if  $\phi$  has no occurrence of either of the quantifiers  $\forall$  or  $\exists$ .

Notice that a quantifier-free formula is the combination of a set of First Order Atoms using the propositional connectives.

#### Definition (Universal-sentence)

... A universal sentence is a sentence (closed formula of the form

$$\forall x_1 \forall x_2 \dots \forall x_n . \phi(x_1, \dots, x_n)$$

where  $\phi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$  is a quantifier-free formula.

#### Definition (Ground instance)

A ground instance of an universal sentence  $\forall x_1 \dots \forall x_n.\phi(x_1,\dots,x_n)$  is a sentence  $\phi(t_1,\dots,t_n)$  obtained by replacing each occurrence of  $x_i$  with a term  $t_i$  that does not contain variables.

Notice that a ground instance of a universal sentence is a logical consequence the universal sentence itself. i.e.,

$$\forall x_1,\ldots,x_n.\phi(x_1,\ldots,x_n) \models \phi(t_1,\ldots,t_n)$$

Therefore if  $\phi(t_1, \ldots, t_n)$  is not valid, then also  $\forall x_1, \ldots, x_n.\phi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ 

- To verify if ∀x<sub>1</sub>,...,x<sub>n</sub>φ(x<sub>1</sub>,...,x<sub>n</sub>) is valid, you can search for an interpretation I and an *n*-tuple of terms t<sub>1</sub>,..., t<sub>n</sub> such that I ⊭ φ(t<sub>1</sub>,...,t<sub>n</sub>). If you find it, then the universal formula is not valid
- but how can we prove that a formula  $\forall x_1, \ldots, x_n \phi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$  is valid?
- we have to check that for all possible interpretations and all possible assignments to the variables  $x_1, \ldots, x_n$  to the elements of the interpretation domain.

- Jacques Herbrand (1908-1931), proposes the main idea to interpret terms in themselves.
- Herbrand poposed to consider  $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$  as the set of all ground terms that can be built from the signature  $\Sigma$ .
- Since  $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$  must contain at least one elment, Herbrand required that  $\Sigma$  contains at least one constant symbol.

#### Definition (Herbrand Universe)

The Herbrand's universe of a signature  $\Sigma$  that contains at least one constant symbol, is the set, denoted by  $\Delta^{\mathcal{H}}$  of ground terms of  $\Sigma$ .

In a Herbrand model, every constant stands for itself. Every function symbol stands for a term-forming operation: f denotes the function that puts 'f(' ... ')' around n elements of  $\mathcal{H}$ .

### Definition

An herbrand interpretation of a signature  $\Sigma$  is composed by the pair  $(\Delta_{\Sigma}^{\mathcal{H}},\mathcal{H}),$  where

- **1**  $\Delta_{\Sigma}^{\mathcal{H}}$  is the Herbrand's universe of  $\Sigma$ ;
- 2  $\mathcal{H}(c) = c$  for every constant symbol  $c \in \Sigma$ ;
- $\mathcal{H}(f): t_1, \ldots, t_n \mapsto f(t_1, \ldots, t_n)$  is the function that maps an *n*-tuple of terms of  $\Delta_{\Sigma}^{\mathcal{H}}$  in a term of  $\Delta_{\Sigma}^{\mathcal{H}}$ , for every *n*-ary function symbol *f*;
- $\mathcal{H}(P) \subseteq (\Delta_{\Sigma}^{H})^{n}$  is a set of *n*-tuples of terms in  $\Delta_{\Sigma}^{\mathcal{H}}$ , for evert *n*-ary predicate symbol  $P \in \Sigma$ .

### Definition (Herbrand base)

The Herbrand base for a signature  $\Sigma$  is the set of ground atomic formulas (i.e., the set of atomic formulas that do not contain individual variables)

$$\mathcal{HB}_{\Sigma} \stackrel{def}{=} \{ P(t_1, \ldots, t_n) | t_1, \ldots, t_n \in \Delta_{\Sigma}^{\mathcal{H}} \}$$

- The Herbrand base can be seen as a (possibily infinite) set of propositional variables,
- an Herbrand interpretation is a truth assignment to them

$$\mathcal{H}:\mathcal{HB}_{\Sigma}\to\{0,1\}$$

• we are back to propositional logic

$$S = \begin{cases} friend(x, y) \rightarrow friend(x, y) \\ friend(x, y) \rightarrow knows(x, mother(y)) \\ friend(Mary, John) \end{cases} \\ \Sigma = \{Mary, John, mother, friend, knows\} \\ \Delta_{\Sigma}^{\mathcal{H}} = \begin{cases} Mary, John, mother(Mary), mother(John), \\ mother(mother(Mary)), mother(mother(John)) \\ mother(...mother(Mary)...), \\ mother(...mother(John)...), \\ ... \end{cases}$$

 $\mathcal{HB}_{\Sigma} = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} friend(John, Mary), friend(Mary, John), \\ friend(John, John), friend(Mary, Mary), \\ knows(John, Mary), knows(Mary, John), \\ knows(John, John), friend(Mary, Mary), \\ friend(mother(John), Mary), friend(Mary, mother(John)), \\ friend(mother(John), mother(John)), \\ knows(mother(John), Mary), knows(Mary, mother(John)), \\ knows(mother(John), mother(John)), \\ \dots \end{array} \right\}$ 

### Theorem (Herbrand's Theorem)

A universal formula  $\forall x_1, \ldots, x_n \phi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$  is satisfiable if it is satisfied by an Herbrand interpretation on the signature  $\Sigma$  that appear in  $\phi$ . If  $\phi$ does not contain constant symbol we extend  $\Sigma$  with a constant symbol a.

## Using Herbrand's Theorem for Sat

- to check if  $\Phi = \forall x_1, \dots, x_n \phi(x_1, \dots, x_n)$  is unsatisfiable we can check if it is false in all the herbrand interpretations.
- $\Psi$  is true in an Herband interpretation  $\mathcal{H}$  iff  $\mathcal{H} \models \mathsf{Ground}(\Phi)$

$$\mathsf{Ground}(\Phi) = \{\phi(t_1, \ldots, t_n) \mid t_i \in \Delta_{\Sigma}^{\mathcal{H}}\}$$

- Φ is unsat iff Ground(Φ) is unsat
- By compactness theorem Ground(Φ) is unsat if a finite subset G ⊂ Ground(Φ) is unsat.
- we can enumerate all the finite subsets, G<sub>0</sub>, G<sub>1</sub>, G<sub>2</sub>,... of Ground(Φ) and check for propositional satisfiability
- If  $\Phi$  is unsat then we eventually discover it
- otherwise we can go on infinitely.

Suppose that in a formula the most internal existential quantifire falls in the scope of k universal quantifiers.

$$\forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_2 \ldots \forall x_k \ldots \exists y \phi(y)$$

Choose a fresh k-place function symbol, say f, and replace y by  $f(x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_k)$ . We get

$$\forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_2 \ldots \forall x_k \ldots \exists y \phi(f(x_1, \ldots, s_n))$$

Repeat this replacement for all existential quantifiers

# Skolemn's Theorem

### Example (Skolemization)

Suppose that we want to check the satisfiability of the  $\Sigma$ -formula  $\exists x F(x)^a$ 

• We have to find an interpretation ( $\Sigma$ -structure)  $\mathcal{I}$ , such that

 $\mathcal{I} \models \exists x. F(x)$ 

ullet i.e., we have to exhibit an element  $d\in\Delta_\mathcal{I}$  such that

 $\mathcal{I} \models F(x)[a_{x \mapsto d}].$ 

• This is equivalent to find an interpretation  $\mathcal{I}'$  of the signature  $\Sigma'$  obtained by extending  $\Sigma$  with a new constant c, i.e. a constant that does not appear in  $\Sigma$  such that

$$\mathcal{I}' \models F(c)$$

- $\mathcal{I}'$  is the same as  $\mathcal{I}$  with the additional interpretation  $\mathcal{I}'(c) = d$ ;
- c is called Skolem constant.
- the transformation of  $\exists x.F(x)$  into F(c) is called Scolemization.

<sup>a</sup>A  $\Sigma$ -formula is a formula in the signature  $\Sigma$ 

# Skolemn's Theorem

### Example (Skolemization)

Suppose that we want to check the satisfiability of the  $\Sigma$ -formula  $\forall x, \exists x F(x, y)$ 

- We have to find an interpretation  $\mathcal{I}$ , such that  $\mathcal{I} \models \forall x \exists y. F(x, y)$ ;
- which implies that for all  $d \in \Delta_\mathcal{I}$

$$\mathcal{I} \models \exists y. F(x, y)[a_{x \mapsto d}]; \tag{1}$$

• to satisfy (1), for every  $d \in \Delta_\mathcal{I}$  we have to exhibit a  $d' \in \Delta_\mathcal{I}$  such that

$$\mathcal{I} \models F(x, y)[a_{x \mapsto d \atop y \mapsto d'}]$$

• This is equivalent to find an interpretation  $\mathcal{I}'$  of the signature  $\Sigma'$  obtained by extending  $\Sigma$  with a new unary functional symbol  $f_{sk}$ , such that

$$\mathcal{I}' \models \forall x. F(x, f_{sk}(x))$$

- I' is the same as I with the additional interpretation I'(f<sub>sk</sub>) equal to the function that maps every d into the d' that satisfies condition (1);
- *f<sub>sk</sub>* is called Skolem function;
- the transformation of  $\forall x \exists y. F(x, y)$  into  $\forall x. F(x, f_{sk}(x))$  is called Scolemization.

Clause: a disjunction of literals

$$\neg K_1 \lor \cdots \lor \neg K_m \lor L_1 \lor \cdots \lor L_n$$

 $\begin{array}{ll} \text{Set notation: } \{\neg K_1, \ldots, \neg K_m, L_1, \ldots, L_n\} \\ \text{Kowalski notation: } & K_1, \ldots, K_m \to L_1, \ldots, L_n \\ & L_1, \ldots, L_n \leftarrow K_1, \ldots, K_m \end{array}$ 

 $\Box$  is the Empty clause:

Empty clause is equivalent to false , meaning Contradiction

• If x is not free in B.

$$(\exists xA) \land B \leftrightarrow \exists x(A \land B)$$
  
 $(\exists xA) \lor B \leftrightarrow \exists x(A \lor B)$ 

To prove A, obtain a contradiction from  $\neg A$ 

- Translate  $\neg A$  into CNF as  $A_1 \land \cdots \land A_m$
- 2 This is the set of clauses  $A_1 \ldots, A_m$
- Transform the clause set, preserving consistency

Deducing the empty clause ( $\Box$ ) refutes  $\neg A$ . This is like in propositional resolution

### Prenex Normal Form

Rename quantified variable, so that each quantifier  $\forall x$  and  $\exists x$  is defined on a separated variable

$$\forall x P(x) \land \exists x P(x) \implies \forall x_1 P(x_1) \land \exists x_2 P(x_2)$$

Convert to Negation Normal Form using the propositional rewriting rules plus the additional rules

$$\neg(\forall xA) \implies \exists x \neg A$$
$$\neg(\exists xA) \implies \forall x \neg A$$

Move quantifiers to the front using (provided x is not free in B)

$$(\forall xA) \land B \equiv \forall x(A \land B)$$
  
 $(\forall xA) \lor B \equiv \forall x(A \lor B)$ 

and the similar rules for  $\exists$ 

For proving

$$\exists x(P(x) \rightarrow \forall yP(y)) \\ \neg [\exists x[P(x) \rightarrow \forall yP(y)]] \\ \forall x[P(x) \land \exists y \neg P(y)] \\ \forall x \exists y[P(x) \land \neg P(y)] \\ \forall x[P(x) \land \neg P(f(x))] \\ \{P(x)\}, \{\neg P(f(x))\}$$

$$\exists x (P(x) \to \forall x P(x))$$

rename variables negated goal conversion to NNF pulling  $\exists$  out Skolem term f(x)Final clauses

- The formula  $\forall x \exists y A$  is consistent
- $\implies$  it holds in some interpretation ( $\Delta$ , I)
- $\implies$  for all  $x \in \Delta$  there is some  $y \in \Delta$  such that A holds
- $\implies$  some function  $F: D \rightarrow D$  yields suitable values of y given x
- $\implies A[f(x)/y]$  holds in some  $(\Delta, I')$  extending  $(\Delta, I)$  so that I'(f) = F.
- $\implies$  the formula  $\forall x A[f(x)/y]$  is consistent.

S is satisfiable if even one model makes all of its clauses true. Differently from propositional logic, There are infinitely many models to consider!

Also many duplicates : "states of the USA" and "the integers 1 to 50" Fortunately, nice models exist.

- They have a uniform structure based on the language's syntax.
- They satisfy the clauses if any model does.

# bibliography

- Ansótegui, Carlos, Maria Luisa Bonet, and Jordi Levy (2013). "SAT-based MaxSAT algorithms". In: Artificial Intelligence 196, pp. 77–105.
  Chakraborty, Supratik, Dror Fried, et al. (2015). "From weighted to unweighted model counting". In: Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
  Chakraborty, Supratik, Kuldeep S Meel, and Moshe Y Vardi (2021).
- "Approximate model counting". In: *Handbook of Satisfiability*. IOS Press, pp. 1015–1045.
- Colnet, Alexis de and Kuldeep S Meel (2019). "Dual hashing-based algorithms for discrete integration". In: International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming. Springer, pp. 161–176.
- Ermon, Stefano et al. (2013). "Taming the curse of dimensionality: Discrete integration by hashing and optimization". In: *International Conference on Machine Learning*. PMLR, pp. 334–342.

 Fu, Zhaohui and Sharad Malik (2006). "On solving the partial MAX-SAT problem". In: International Conference on Theory and Applications of the solution of the s

Luciano Serafini (Fondazione Bruno Kessler) Knowledge Representation and Learning

イロト イヨト イヨト イヨト