

LECTURE 15, April 27, 23

GAME THEORY. $\Phi \in C(A \times B)$, A, B compact metric spaces.

MARGINAL FNS.: $\Phi^{\max}(b) := \max_a \Phi(a, b)$, $\Phi^{\min}(a) := \min_b \Phi(a, b)$

Best Response: $R^A(b) := \arg \max_a \Phi(a, b)$, $R^B(a) = \arg \min_b \Phi(a, b)$

UPPER VALUE: $V^+ := \min_b \Phi^{\max}(b) = \min_b \max_a \Phi(a, b)$

LOWER VALUE: $V^- := \max_a \Phi^{\min}(b) = \max_a \min_b \Phi(a, b)$

Hop. $V^- \leq V^+$. If $V^- = V^+$ game has a VALUE.

Examples of $V^- \neq V^+$.

Ex. MATRIX GAMES

$$\Phi(i, j) = \phi_{ij}$$

$$\left(\begin{array}{ccc} \phi_{11} & \dots & \phi_{1n} \\ \vdots & & \vdots \\ \phi_{m1} & \dots & \phi_{mn} \end{array} \right) \xrightarrow{\text{min}}$$

$$\min_j \phi_{1j} = \bar{\Phi}^{\min}(1)$$

$$\min_j \phi_{mj} = \bar{\Phi}^{\min}(m)$$

$$\max_i (\max_j \Phi(i, j)) = \max_i \phi_{i1}$$

$$\max_i \phi_{ic} \xrightarrow{\min_j} V^+ = \min_j \max_i \Phi(i, j)$$

$$V^- = \max_i \min_j \Phi(i, j)$$

Ex. 2. "Cake"

$$0 \leq \varepsilon < \frac{1}{2}$$

$$\begin{pmatrix} \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon & \frac{1}{2} - \varepsilon \\ \frac{3}{5} & \frac{1}{5} \end{pmatrix} \xrightarrow{\text{max}} \frac{1}{2} - \varepsilon$$

max (

$$\frac{3}{5}$$

$$\frac{1}{2} - \varepsilon$$

$$v^- = \frac{1}{2} - \varepsilon$$

$$\min \quad \frac{1}{2} - \varepsilon = v^+$$

) max

$\Rightarrow v = \frac{1}{2} - \varepsilon$ is THE VALUE of the game.

Ex 3 "Head & Tail"

$$\begin{pmatrix} -1 & -1 \\ -1 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \xrightarrow{\text{max}} -1$$

max

$$($$

$$-$$

Head

$$v^- = -1 < v^+ = 1$$

$$\min \quad 1 \quad 1 \quad v^+ = 1 \quad v^- = -1$$


The VALUE does not exist!

————— ⇒ —————

Def. A SADDLE POINT of the game is $(a^*, b^*) \in A \times B$:

$$\forall a \in A \quad \underline{\Phi}(a, b^*) \leq \overline{\Phi}(a^*, b^*) \leq \overline{\Phi}(a^*, b) \quad \forall b \in B$$

Ex. $A = B = [-1, 1]$ $\overline{\Phi}(a, b) = b^2 - a^2$



$$b^* = a^* = 0 \text{ is a SADDLE}$$

Rmk : (a^*, b^*) is a saddle pt. \Leftrightarrow

$$(S) \quad \max_a \underline{\Phi}(a, b^*) \leq \underline{\Phi}(a^*, b^*) \leq \min_b \overline{\Phi}(a^*, b)$$

$$a^* \in R^A(b^*) \quad b^* \in R^B(a^*)$$

$$(S) \Leftrightarrow (S') \quad \max_a \underline{\Phi}(a, b^*) = \underline{\Phi}(a^*, b^*) = \min_b \overline{\Phi}(a^*, b).$$

Rmk. Suppose R^A & R^B are functions (single-valued)

$R^A: B \rightarrow A$, $R^B: A \rightarrow B$. (a^*, b^*) saddle \Rightarrow

a^* is a fixed point of $R^A \circ R^B: A \rightarrow A$ because

$$R^A \circ R^B(a^*) = R^A(b^*) = a^*.$$

& b^* is a fixed point of $R^B \circ R^A: B \rightarrow B$. \square

Def. SECURITY STRATEGIES. $v^+ = \min_b \overline{\Phi}^{\max}(b)$

is b^* : $v^+ = \overline{\Phi}^{\max}(b^*)$, i.e., b^* $\in \arg\min_b \overline{\Phi}^{\max}(b)$ for 2^ω player.

a^* is S.S. for 1st player if $v^- = \underline{\Phi}^{\min}(a^*)$

i.e., $a^* \in \arg\min_a \underline{\Phi}^{\min}(a)$

Thm. The game has a value $\Leftrightarrow \exists$ a saddle point.

Pf "≤" Ass.: (a^*, b^*) saddle pt. Goal: $v^+ \leq v^-$

$$v^- = \max_a \min_b \underline{\Phi}(a, b) \geq \min_b \underline{\Phi}(a^*, b) = \max_a \underline{\Phi}(a, b^*)$$

$$\geq \min_b \max_a \underline{\Phi}(a, b) = v^+. \quad \square$$

Rank a^* is a SEC. STR. for 1st player. b^* is S.S. for 2nd

" \Rightarrow " Ass $v^+ = v^-$. Take a^* e SEC. STR. for A.

$$v^- = \underline{\Phi}^{\min}(a^*) = \min_b \underline{\Phi}(a^*, b)$$

Take b^* e SEC. STR. for B : $v^+ = \overline{\Phi}^{\max}(b^*) = \max_a \overline{\Phi}(a, b^*)$

$$\forall a \in A \quad \underline{\Phi}(a, b^*) \leq \max_a \underline{\Phi}(a, b^*) = v^+ \stackrel{\text{Ass}}{=} v^- = \min_b \overline{\Phi}(a^*, b) \\ \leq \overline{\Phi}(a^*, b) \quad \forall b$$

$$\text{For } a = a^*, b = b^* \Rightarrow \overline{\Phi}(a^*, b^*) = v^+ = v^- \leq \overline{\Phi}(a^*, b^*)$$

\Rightarrow " \leq " or " $=$ " $\Rightarrow \overline{\Phi}(a^*, b^*) = v \neq v$ (S) hold,

$\Rightarrow (a^*, b^*)$ e SADDLE PT. \blacksquare

Corollary If game has a value \Rightarrow

(i) (a^*, b^*) is a saddle $\Leftrightarrow a^*$ is SEC. STR for 1st
 b^* is S.S. for 2nd

(ii) (EXCHANGEABILITY) : If (\bar{a}, \bar{b}) is also a saddle.

$\Rightarrow (a^*, \bar{b}), (\bar{a}, b^*)$ are saddles.

Pf (ii) See pf. of thm. (ii) from (i). \blacksquare

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THE MINIMAX THEOREM of Von Neumann (1924)

Thm : $A, B \subseteq$ vector spaces, COMPACT & CONVEX, $\Phi \in C(A \times B)$

Φ CONCAVE-CONVEX i.e.,

$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \forall b, \quad \alpha \mapsto \Phi(\alpha, b) \text{ is concave} \\ \forall \alpha, \quad b \mapsto \Phi(\alpha, b) \text{ is convex} \end{array} \right.$

$\Rightarrow V^+ = V^-$, i.e., (A, B, Φ) has a value & at least one saddle point.

PROOF: will be shown if $A \subseteq \mathbb{R}^m$, $B \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$.


Rank. Supp. $\Phi(\cdot, \cdot)$ strictly convex \Rightarrow unique

$$\forall \alpha \in A : \Phi(\alpha, r(\alpha)) = \min_b \Phi(\alpha, b)$$

$$\Rightarrow R^B(\alpha) = \{r(\alpha)\}.$$

Lemma. If $\Phi(\cdot, \cdot)$ is strictly convex $\forall \alpha \in A$, $\Phi \in C$, A, B compact, convex $\Rightarrow r: A \rightarrow B$ is continuous.

Rank. Not true without convexity.



here r jumps to right at \hat{z} . $R^B(\hat{z})$

Pf. Lemma. $\bar{a} \in A$, $a_n \rightarrow \bar{a}$ then: $r(a_n) \xrightarrow{n \rightarrow \infty} r(\bar{a})$

Extract a_{n_k} : $r(a_{n_k}) \rightarrow \bar{b} \in B$ (B compact.)

$$\Rightarrow \Phi(\alpha_{n_k}, r(a_{n_k})) \rightarrow \Phi(\bar{\alpha}, \bar{b}) \quad k \rightarrow \infty$$

$\forall b \quad \Phi(a_{n_k}, b) \leq \Phi(\alpha_{n_k}, b) \rightarrow \Phi(\bar{\alpha}, b)$

$$\Rightarrow \underline{\Phi}(\bar{a}, b) \geq \bar{\Phi}(\bar{a}, \bar{b}) \quad \forall b \in B$$

$$\Rightarrow \bar{b} = r(\bar{a}) \Rightarrow r(a_{n_k}) \xrightarrow[n \rightarrow \infty]{b \rightarrow \bar{b}} r(\bar{a})$$

By the arbitrariness of $a_{n_k} \Rightarrow r(a_n) \rightarrow r(\bar{a}) \quad n \rightarrow \infty$.

Pf of V.N.Theorem: Step 1. Supp. If $a \in A$ $b \mapsto \underline{\Phi}(a, b)$ is strictly convex. Then $r(a)$ cont.

$$\underline{\Phi}(a, r(a)) = \min_b \underline{\Phi}(a, b)$$

Step 2. Take at sec. strat. for 1st pl., i.e.,

$$v^* = \max_a \underline{\Phi}^{\min}(a) = \underline{\Phi}^{\min}(a^*) \quad b^* := r(a^*)$$

Goal: (a^*, b^*) is a saddle pt.

$$\text{Note: } \underline{\Phi}(a^*, b^*) = \min_b \underline{\Phi}(a^*, b) \leq \underline{\Phi}(a^*, b) \quad \forall b$$

Reaches the goal. $\underline{\Phi}(a^*, b^*) \geq \underline{\Phi}(a, b^*) \quad \forall a$

Step 3.: Idea: approximate a^* with $a_d := \alpha + (1-\alpha)a^* \quad (\rightarrow a^* \text{ if } \alpha \rightarrow 0)$
 Fix $a \in A$, $\alpha \in [0, 1]$, $\alpha = 1 - \beta$

$$\underline{\Phi}(a^*, b^*) \geq \underline{\Phi}^{\min}(a^*) \geq \underline{\Phi}^{\min}(a_d) =$$

$a^* \text{ is sec. STRAT}$

$$= \underline{\Phi}(a_d, r(a_d)) \geq \beta \underline{\Phi}(a, r(a_d)) + \beta \underline{\Phi}(a^*, r(a_d))$$

$\underline{\Phi}$ conc. in a .

$$\geq \beta \underline{\Phi}(a, r(a_d)) + (1-\beta) \underline{\Phi}^{\min}(a^*)$$

$$\Rightarrow \cancel{\underline{\Phi}^{\min}(a^*)} \geq \cancel{\underline{\Phi}(a, r(a_d))} \quad \downarrow \beta \rightarrow 0+$$

$$\Rightarrow \Phi^{unif}(a^+) \geq \Phi(a, s(a^+)) \quad \text{use LEMMA 1}$$

$$\Rightarrow \Phi^{unif}(a^+) \geq \Phi(a, b^+) \quad \text{by}$$

$\Phi(a^+, b^+) \geq \Phi(a, b^+)$ which is the goal \blacksquare st. 1

Step 4 Remove the strict convexity of $b \mapsto \Phi(a, b)$.

For simplicity here $B \subseteq \mathbb{R}^k$. Fix $\varepsilon > 0$.

$$\Phi_\varepsilon(a, b) = \Phi(a, b) + \varepsilon |b|^2 \quad \text{is STRICTLY CONVEX}$$

$\forall b \quad \forall a$

st. 2-3 $\Rightarrow \Phi_\varepsilon$ has a saddle point $(a_\varepsilon, b_\varepsilon)$, i.e.

$$\forall a \quad \Phi_\varepsilon(a, b_\varepsilon) \leq \Phi_\varepsilon(a_\varepsilon, b_\varepsilon) \leq \Phi_\varepsilon(a_\varepsilon, b) \quad \forall b.$$

By compactness of A, B , extracted $\varepsilon_n \downarrow 0+$:

$$a_{\varepsilon_n} \rightarrow a^+ \in A, \quad b_{\varepsilon_n} \rightarrow b^+ \in B.$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Phi_{\varepsilon_n}(a, b_{\varepsilon_n}) &\leq V_{\varepsilon_n} = \Phi_{\varepsilon_n}(a_{\varepsilon_n}, b_{\varepsilon_n}) = \Phi(a_{\varepsilon_n}, b_{\varepsilon_n}) + \varepsilon_n |b_{\varepsilon_n}|^2 \\ &\leq \Phi(a_{\varepsilon_n}, b) + \varepsilon_n |b|^2 \quad \forall b \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{let } \varepsilon_n \rightarrow 0 \quad \Phi(a, b^+) \leq \Phi(a^+, b^+) \leq \Phi(a^+, b) \quad \forall b$$

$\Rightarrow (a^+, b^+)$ is a SADDLE. \blacksquare

Examples. 1: $\Phi(a, b) = \varphi_1(a) - \varphi_2(b)$

φ_1, φ_2 CONCAVE in $[1, 1]^m \Rightarrow$ Thm. applies.

2. IMPORTANT : $\Phi(a, b) = a^T M b$ $M \in \mathbb{M}_{m \times n}$

$a \in A \subseteq \mathbb{R}^m$, $b \in B \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$. Φ is bilinear \Rightarrow
 \uparrow cont. & linear in a & b

$\Rightarrow \Phi$ conc.-convex THM. is OK.

3. MATRIX GAMES $A = \{1, \dots, m\}$, $B = \{1, \dots, n\}$.

one NOT convex, V.A.T. does NOT apply & in
 fact we know examples without value.

MIXED STRATEGIES. , Idea: I choose in a stochastic
 instead of deterministic way.

Def. A mixed strategy of 2nd player is a $\mu \in P(B) :=$
 $= \{\text{probability measures on } B\}$. and for 2nd player it is
 $\nu \in P(A) = \{ \text{--- on } A \}$.

Ex: $\delta_{\bar{a}} = \text{Dirac measure concentrated in } \bar{a} \in A$. i.e.

$$\text{If } S \subseteq A \text{ Borel} \quad \delta_{\bar{a}}(S) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \bar{a} \in S \\ 0 & \text{if } \bar{a} \notin S \end{cases}$$

$P(A) \geq \text{"copy of } A"$. $A = \text{pure strategies}$

Def $\tilde{\Phi}(\mu, \nu) := \iint_{A \times B} \Phi(a, b) d\mu(a) d\nu(b)$

$$\tilde{\Phi} : P(A) \times P(B) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}.$$

$$\text{N.B. } \tilde{\Phi}(\delta_{\bar{a}}, \delta_{\bar{b}}) = \underset{A \times B}{\iint} \Phi(a, b) d\delta_{\bar{a}}(a) d\delta_{\bar{b}}(b) =$$

$$= \tilde{\Phi}(\bar{a}, \bar{b})$$

$\left[\int_A f(a) d\delta_{\bar{a}}(a) = f(\bar{a}) \right]$

$\Rightarrow \tilde{\Phi}$ "EXTENDS" Φ from $A \times B$ to $P(A) \times P(B)$

Def. If 3 value of the game ($P(A), P(D), \tilde{\Phi}$) \in a saddle pt., they are called value & saddle of
 $(A, B, \tilde{\Phi})$ in mixed. strategies.